Blog 2 - The Slanted Chessboard

The Slanted Chessboard

Reacting to the New Australian Dilemmas in an Age of Instability

Foreword

The Australian Defence Strategic Review released in 2023 laid out plans to create a more lethal Australian Defence Force, describing the force in its current state as not fit for purpose. Despite making such implicit references to the purpose and mission of the ADF, political and international considerations kept the DSR from explicitly mentioning China by name. Additionally, flawed strategic rationale prevented the study from challenging established preconceptions of the ADF’s area of operations, which are themselves no longer fit for purpose. The DSR therefore failed to comprehensively address the need to reorient the Australian Defence Force as, although it correctly discerned a need for greater range, flexibility, firepower and depth of inventory in the ADF, an inability to redefine the geographic space on which the ADF should focus its planning hindered the ability of the DSR to prescribe a focussed force. This article will build upon the DSR by drawing the structure of the ADF from the geographical analysis of Australia’s defence in the 21st century laid out in the preceding blog post.

Although the second post in this blog was originally to focus on ADF force structure, it instead became a follow up to Pitched Battle focussing on the minutiae of Australia’s geopolitical circumstances, with a view to describing the specific ways in which Southwest Pacific Security is linked to East Asian security through politics as well as geography.

Key Assumptions per Previous Blog

As described in the previous blog, titled “Pitched Battle”, the ADF must be equipped and organised according to the assumption that the foremost geographic feature in Australian defence against East Asian hegemons is the conduits of the Asian Maritime Condominium. The People’s Republic of China has undertaken a campaign of political interference in Australia, attempts to subvert Australia’s trade policy and a policy of acquiring territories and extraterritorial rights from other sovereign states. Its government also shows an intention to subvert the security and foreign policies of states such as Australia to isolate them from its chief rival and enforce its own hegemony in Asia in its global competition with the United States. These factors have made the Asian Maritime Condominium an object of necessary importance in Australian defence planning again, and therefore the most efficient force structures and force planning must be defined in view of this reality, with an aim to capitalise on the advantages of operating in the area of decisive effect.

Due to the development of Borneo making power projection through the Malay Archipelago unviable, this condominium now comes to a chokepoint in the Bismarck Sea and Archipelago, a littoral area which also interposes itself between the pathway of the Asian Maritime Condominium through the Philippines and its natural culmination in the Oceanic Archipelagoes, and thus the Bismarck Sea littoral will feature heavily in this article as a point of interest.

Anticipating the Inconceivable

This framing of the geographic fundamentals and geopolitical circumstances of Australia’s security must also take into consideration the likelihood that different security contingencies may confront Australia in the coming years. The threats that China poses to Australia’s security, prosperity and international autonomy may materialise in military conflict under a number of circumstances, the foremost of which are an invasion by China of Taiwan, the outbreak of civil unrest due to Chinese interference in the Oceanic Archipelagoes and a conflict between China and one of the parties to the disputes in the South China Sea. China possesses a broad and sophisticated arsenal of area denial weaponry, including Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles, short range missile armed warships, short range submarines and the largest Air Force in the world outside the United States. It also possesses a fragile, inexperienced but rapidly growing power projection force centred around blue water naval assets including amphibious assault ships and platform dock ships, aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines.

In a Taiwan contingency the government of China may use the threat of these capabilities to attempt to keep the United States and allies including Australia neutral at the cost of facing greater risk from unimpeded military intervention should these states become involved on their own initiative. The government of China may otherwise choose to hedge its bets and strike at deployed American military assets in Eastern Asia and confront the United States in a limited war, pressuring and coercing American allies to deny support to the United States. The government of China may also, finally, choose to strike US bases, assets and allied infrastructure in South Korea, Japan, Australia and the US Pacific territories to limit the capacity of these states to respond, at the cost of bringing about war with a larger coalition. Although all three of these scenarios represent vastly different calculations to America and its East Asian allies, the requirements on Australian defence policymaking are far less varied between the three contingencies.

In all three scenarios, the government of Australia could not be certain whether China would or would not strike either the Australian Defence Force or US assets in Australian territory, and if given a forewarning by intelligence would likely withdraw Australian assets from China’s seaboard to preserve precious Australian naval and air assets from the most intense arrays of firepower in the Chinese arsenal. In all three scenarios, Australian policymakers will find that a militaristic assertion of Chinese hegemony in East Asia does not bode well for future Australian security but will have limited capability to contribute conventional capabilities to the fight in Eastern Asia in any sustainable way, given the capability of the PRC armed forces to attrit even advanced assets operating in their near abroad.

The Australian government will therefore find that, as in peace time, its most effective way to influence the outcome of political or military contests in the event of a Taiwan contingency is to provide logistical support for more ubiquitous conventional forces of likeminded partners, foremost among them the United States. This logic holds true also for a potential outbreak of conflict in the South China Sea, where the Australian Defence Forces will be equally unable to sustain protracted wartime deployments to China’s near seas. Of the three contingencies, however, the outbreak of conflict in the South China Sea has become the least threatening as the political stakes therein are limited, and thus conflict surrounding the South China Sea may not escalate beyond skirmish without miscalculation by one side. The Philippines and other local stakeholders have seen their territorial integrity eroded, but the disputes in the South China Sea are not existential in the same vein as disputes in the Taiwan Strait. For Australia, this limits the consequences of such a conflict to unfavourable shifts in the regional balance of power and unwelcome displacement of alliance credibility. The stakes for China are likewise limited to control over a valuable sea lane, an important but not existential aspiration, and the Chinese government is therefore unlikely to escalate closer to the Australian mainland in order to win a conflict in the South China Sea. The threats of miscalculation during routine patrols and enforcement of disputed claims remain a threat, but the limited stakes of the South China Sea and its isolation from the politics of the Southwest Pacific reduce the profile of this contingency in Australian threat analysis.

Endgame in the Southwest Pacific

The same cannot be said, however, for the prospect of an outbreak of conflict in the Southwest Pacific. The situation in Australia’s near abroad is delicate, as disputes over climate policy, development funding and previous Australian interventions and peacekeeping deployments in the region have come to a head in the Solomon Islands. Local political leadership have become dissatisfied with Australian governments and have sought alternative methods of development assistance offered by the People’s Republic of China.

It must also be mentioned that the People’s Republic of China practices elite capture through diplomatic channels and without scruples, aiming to manipulate political leadership in the Southwest Pacific by offering personal gains in exchange for alterations of national policy. In addition, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the Southwest Pacific has seen years of quiet competition between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, both of which offer finances and bribes to local governments in exchange for support in their diplomatic disputes in the Taiwan Strait. Australia therefore sees its security threatened in a sometimes irrational and unpredictable region which houses aspiring strongmen and foreign diplomats willing to both fund and subvert them. These tensions have appeared foremost in the Solomon Islands, where the political rivalry between Chinese governments intersects with ethnic tensions in the conflict between the Islands of Guadalcanal, the seat of federal power, and Malaita, where the ROC has concentrated its efforts at elite capture.

The situation in the Southwest Pacific will be further complicated by the arrival of a new government in Bougainville, which will become independent from Papua New Guinea by 2027. This new government is likely to look for partners wherever it can find them, as local leadership have set priorities for sustainable development upon achieving independence, and the arrival of a new nation with an untested government may create a vacuum of power on the island if it is not resourced properly. There are additional tensions in play in French New Caledonia and the looming threat of additional crises created by climate change which may set conditions of mass movement conducive to additional ethnic and political conflicts in the region.

Australian policymakers therefore face the possibility that the People’s Republic of China may opportunistically attempt to capitalise on the ambitions of local politicians and create the conditions for strongman regimes operating in the Southwest Pacific which may be amenable to Chinese military presence, especially if this helps them consolidate power over their governments. Such a scenario would also prime the region for conflict, as the example of the Solomon Islands shows, any attempt by the People’s Republic of China to assert its influence in the Solomon Islands will exacerbate ethnic tensions within the country between Guadalcanal and Malaita. The People’s Republic of China may be further incentivised to abrogate the political status quo of the Solomon Islands and other Southwest Pacific flashpoints because a military presence therein would divide Australia from the United States and thereby advance Chinese aims of dissecting and dismantling American-led security arrangements in its region which do not advance its interests.

Sailing into Rough Seas

The Southwest Pacific threats Australia faces consist of reckless diplomacy and elite capture between Chinese governments, or deliberate attempts to subvert Australian security in the wider Sino-American competition. The latter may escalate into ethnic conflicts along long standing fault lines or civil subversion by strongman governments in which the People’s Republic of China would offer the support of its armed forces to local elements hostile to Australian interests.

In addition to the need to withdraw beyond the range of Chinese firepower in either a Taiwan or South China Sea conflict contingency, Australian Defence Force assets in the former scenario may also be required for operations in the Southwest Pacific in a Southwest Pacific contingency to deter, disarm of defeat Chinese attempts to impose military solutions on local political problems. Such a scenario, however, would create two opportunities for the Australian Defence Forces; it would create a reaction in neighbouring states which do not wish to see Chinese military assets deployed in the Southwest Pacific such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji and New Zealand, and it would legitimise Australian attempts to destroy such assets in the event of any of a Taiwan or Southwest Pacific contingency.

The veins of geopolitical tension across the Taiwan Strait run along the Asian Maritime Condominium and culminate off Australia’s shores, in the Southwest Pacific. Unlike a South China Sea contingency which would require Australia manage its ability to support American forces and engage in limited coalition deterrence operations, the Southwest Pacific and Taiwan contingencies thus both demand that the ADF prepare to face a surge of Chinese power projection along the Asian Maritime Condominium which, no matter where the conflict begins, will result in Australia facing the prospect of Chinese military adventurism close to home.

The situation in the Southwest Pacific is very unstable and will remain so for the foreseeable future, and this must have an effect on ADF force planning. This is because, unlike Australia’s role in any contingencies in Taiwan or the South China Sea, the ADF is both best positioned geographically and diplomatically and most experienced in preparing for operations in the Southwest Pacific. Furthermore, the aforementioned political subversion by both Chinese governments in the Southwest Pacific makes an outbreak of violence through proxies more likely in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Australian policymakers should thus consider that the outbreak of conflict with the potential to upend Australian security in East Asia could have even greater ramifications for Australian security closer to home. The ADF would therefore have to operate first and foremost in the Southwest Pacific in either outbreak of conflict. Constant deterrence patrols and a wartime surge will both require that Australia’s foremost ally, the United States, and its emerging Asian allies will all have to concentrate their efforts on countering the world class military China now possesses in East Asia in both war and peacetime. Australia therefore cannot and should not count on other allied militaries to operate alongside it in the Southwest Pacific in enough strength to significantly alter the balance of power in the region. That balance will rest on the capabilities the ADF can bring to the fight alongside the partners it can retain and support in its near abroad.

The need to dismantle Chinese assets in the Southwest Pacific in wartime, then consolidate the region against further encroachment and eventually defeat any attempt to reassert military strength in the Oceanic Archipelagoes means the ADF must operate a versatile force. Geography and circumstance do not require an area denial force, they require a force which can project power against hostile forward military positions, switch missions to sea and airlift and consolidation of those positions, and then switch missions again to defeating any renewed expeditionary forces advancing down the Asian Maritime Condominium into the Southwest Pacific to reclaim those military bases.

Final Analysis

The above requirements lay out a need for an Australian Defence Force significantly more capable than its current self. In addition to hard capabilities, soft factors will also dictate Australia’s ability to contain China’s military footprint in Oceania. Just as Chinese power advances through a fusion of military and diplomatic means, so to must it be met and defeated by similar combinations of cooperation and trust building between Australia and its North-Eastern neighbours to allow the ADF to operate in its near abroad with the support of friendly nations when the need arises. Such strategies for pursuing a new approach to Australian defence and the military-diplomatic fusion of power in the 2020s requires further analysis later in this blog series. The ways in which Australia can create such a force without breaking the Treasury or stretching it too thin, being always able to consolidate force based on sound philosophies of force design, will be explored in the next article focussing on the ADF and its force structure.